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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law," and Utah Code
section 78-2-2(3)(c), which provides that the Court has appellate jurisdiction over
"discipline of lawyers."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1:

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Utah

State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") has no authority to premise
an unauthorized practice of law complaint upon an administrative suspension.
The applicable standard of review is a correctness standard. See In re Babilis.
951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue was preserved in the District Court by legal
memorandum and the oral argument of counsel. (R. 88-207; 904:12-13)
Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Bar has
no authority to administratively suspend attorneys for failure to pay their annual
licensing fees. The applicable standard of review is a correctness standard. See
In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue was preserved in the District
Court by legal memorandum and the oral argument of counsel. (R. 88-207; 904:
12-18)
Issue 3: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the OPC has
no authority to bring this action. The applicable standard of review is a
correctness standard. See In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue

was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum and the oral argument
of counsel. (R. 88-207; 904:12-18)
Issue 4: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Complaint
failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability and Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The applicable standard of
review is a correctness standard. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).
The issue was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum. (R. 88-207)
Issue 5: Whether the District Court erred in the context of entering a
summary judgment in making factual findings, such as the finding that
Sonnenreich received no notice of the administrative suspension. The applicable
standard of review is a correctness standard. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207
(Utah 1997). The issue was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum
and the oral argument of counsel. (R. 290-303; 904:12-18)
Issue 6: Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to
Sonnenreich based upon its determination that the OPC's action against
Sonnenreich was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith within
the meaning of Utah Code section 78-27-56. This issue is a mixed question of
law and fact, and the applicable standard of review is an abuse of discretion
standard. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). The
issue was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum and the oral
argument of counsel. (R. 491-538; 905:18-30)
Issue 7: Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees in
an amount that was unreasonable.

The applicable standard of review is an
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abuse of discretion standard. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah
1996). The issue was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum.
(R. 707-731)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are set forth
verbatim in the addendum.
Statutes
Utah Code § 78-27-56
Rules
Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case originated in a disciplinary action the OPC filed in District Court
against Sharon Sonnenreich.

(R. 1-4)

The OPC alleges that Sonnenreich

engaged in the unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct when she continued to practice law after the Utah State
Bar administratively suspended her for failure to pay her annual licensing fee.
(R.1-4)
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
The OPC filed a District Court Complaint against Sonnenreich on April 24,
2000. (R. 1-4) Sonnenreich filed an Answer on May 24, 2000. (R. 12-20) The
action terminated when the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision
pursuant to Sonnenreich's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and ordered
summary judgment in Sonnenreich's favor, dismissing the OPC's Complaint with
prejudice on the merits.

(R. 282-289; 331-332)- Sonnenreich subsequently

moved for an award of attorney's fees, which the District Court granted. (R. 342;
669-675; 803-805) Later, the District Court revised the amount of the award, but
not its substantive basis. (R. 893-894)
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RELEVANT FACTS
The Events Leading to the Initiation of the Case in District Court
The OPC contends that in 1999, Sonnenreich failed to pay her annual
licensing fee.1

(R. 1-4)

The Utah State Bar ("the Bar") administratively

suspended Sonnenreich for her alleged non-payment of the licensing fee, and
during the period of her administrative suspension was not authorized to practice
law in the State of Utah. (R. 1-4) The OPC contends that the Bar's Executive
Director gave Sonnenreich notice2 at her address on record with the Bar that her
name had been removed from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in
Utah by reason of her failure to pay her 1999-2000 license fees. (R. 115) The
OPC contends that Sonnenreich continued to practice law and hold herself out
as an attorney after she had been administratively suspended for non-payment of
dues. (R. 1-4) Sonnenreich paid her 1999 licensing fee on January 7, 2000 and
the Bar immediately reinstated her from the administrative suspension. (R. 3)
The OPC initiated an informal complaint against Sonnenreich predicated
upon her alleged UPL during the time of her interim suspension, served her with
a Notice of Informal Complaint, and referred the matter to a Screening Panel of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee ("Screening Panel"). The Screening Panel
convened to hear Sonnenreich's case in late March 2000. (R. 1-4)
The Screening Panel recommended "[t]hat a formal complaint be filed
against the respondent." (R. 1-4; 151-156) The Screening Panel Information
1

This allegation, along with others noted herein, has never been adjudicated,
inasmuch as the District Court summarily dismissed the OPC's action against
Sonnenreich.
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Sheet, a form filled out and signed by the Chair of the Screening Panel, stated in
part as follows:
There is probable cause to believe that the Respondent was
engaged in professional misconduct with regard to Rule 5.5. With
specific reference to this Rule[ ], the Panel finds these facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.

Based upon the facts found by the Panel that the Respondent
engaged in professional misconduct with respect to Rule[ ] 5.5 and
that the Respondent acted negligently, the Panel recommends that
a formal complaint be filed against the Respondent regarding Rule[
]5.5.
(R. 154-155) In the alternative, the Screening Panel could, among other things,
have dismissed the informal complaint altogether3 or recommended that
Sonnenreich receive an admonition; it took neither of these actions as to the UPL
allegation. (R. 155-156)
The District Court Action
The OPC filed the Complaint on April 24, 2000. (R. 1-4) It was signed by
the OPC attorney assigned to the case and also by the person who was then the
Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee.4 (R. 1-4) The Complaint alleged
that Sonnenreich had been administratively suspended for failing to pay her
annual licensing fee, but nevertheless continued to hold herself out as an
2

One of the central issues of this case is whether the RLDD require actual
notice.
3
Indeed, the Panel dismissed two alleged rule violations brought against
Sonnenreich based upon its "belief that there was not probable cause to
conclude there was professional misconduct" as to those charges. (R. 156)
4
The District Court Complaint, known as a "formal" Complaint, must be signed by
the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, or by another Committee
member in the Chair's absence. See Rule 11(a), RLDD. Accordingly, although
the OPC attorney assigned primary responsibility for the case drafted and signed
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attorney and practice law in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 14)
Sonnenreich filed an Answer on May 24, 2000.

(R. 12-20)

Shortly

thereafter, she filed a Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, along with a
memorandum and affidavit in support thereof.

(R. 26-27; 28-49; 50-81)

Sonnenreich filed the Motion for Judgment on Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, but it was converted to a Motion for Summary
Judgment because it was supported and opposed by papers outside of the
pleadings.

(R. 50-81; 111-113)

Sonnenreich contended that the Bar has no

authority to suspend attorneys or judges; that the action against Sonnenreich can
only be instituted by the Board of Bar Commissioners; that the Complaint did not
state in plain and concise language the facts upon which the charge of
unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable rules; the Complaint was not
predicated upon a screening panel finding of probable cause to believe there are
grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint is merited. (R. 26-27)
The District Court heard brief oral argument on Sonnenreich's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, then entered a Memorandum Decision granting
"judgment on the pleadings" in Sonnenreich's favor.5

(R. 904; 281; 282-289)

The Memorandum Decision stated grounds summarized as follows: (1) The Bar
[OPC] may not premise a UPL action upon an administrative suspension; (2)
the Complaint, the person who was the Chair at the time the action was filed
against Sonnenreich also reviewed and signed it.
5
The Judgment was signed by Judge Iwasaki for Judge Stirba. Judge Stirba
entered the Memorandum Decision of January 8, 2001, and presided over the
case to this point. By the time the case reached the phase at which the District

7

Sonnenreich received no actual notice of the administrative suspension; (3) only
minor forms of discipline are warranted when an attorney's misconduct is
negligent and causes no actual injury; (4) the OPC [Bar] has no authority to
suspend attorneys because this is the province of the Supreme Court, and
further, the OPC had no authority to bring this action because such actions must
be instituted by the Board of Bar Commissioners; (5) the Complaint fails to
provide sufficient facts to satisfy Rule 11 of the RLDD or Rule 8 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.6 (R. 282-289) The court's decision was predicated in part upon
this Court's decision in In re Crandall.7 (R. 285-286)
Sonnenreich prepared a proposed Judgment which provided that she was
entitled to costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
the Court retained jurisdiction to consider attorney fees under the bad faith filing
statute. Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, the OPC objected
to the proposed Judgment, among other things noting that Sonnenreich's motion
should be treated as a motion for summary judgment.

(R. 290-304)

Sonnenreich responded to the OPC's objections, and submitted a Judgment
[Revised Form] that set forth the same ruling as the proposed Judgment, and

Court considered Sonnenreich's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, it had been assigned
to Judge Burton.
6
The court appears to have made the common assumption that the Bar and its
actions are one and the same as the OPC and its actions. Indeed, the
nomenclatural distinction between the two has not always been vigorously
maintained by the OPC itself, and often the difference is of no consequence.
Nevertheless, the distinction is significant in this context because it is the Bar that
administratively suspends attorneys, whereas the OPC has no authority to
suspend anyone, either for disciplinary or administrative reasons.
7
In re Crandall. 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989).
8

included language to the effect that Sonnenreich had filed an Affidavit with
Supporting Materials. (R. 305-320; 318-320)
The District Court through a Minute Entry found that Sonnenreich's
[Revised Form of] Judgment accurately reflected its decision, but also found that
through "clerical error," because of the affidavits filed by the parties, it should
have considered Sonnenreich's motion under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure rather than as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (R. 323-325)
The District Court requested that Sonnenreich submit a corrected form of
judgment.

(R. 323) The District Court ordered Judgment on April 25, 2001

pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing the
OPC's action against Sonnenreich "with prejudice on the merits." (R. 331-332)
The Judgment of April 25 was the subject of a Notice of Appeal filed by
the OPC in May 2001 ("first appeal").

(R. 333-335)

Sonnenreich moved to

summarily dismiss the OPC's first appeal. Motion for Summary Disposition and
for Attorneys' Fees, Supreme Court Case No. 20010459-SC, June 15, 2001.
In June, Sonnenreich filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-27-56 ("the bad faith filing statute"). (R. 342; 344-487) The OPC
opposed the motion, and Sonnenreich filed a reply. (R. 491-538; 542-652)
This Court summarily dismissed the OPC's first appeal. (R. 667) The
Order noted that the dismissal was granted "for reasons other than those
presented by the respondent," and although the appeal was dismissed because
it was prematurely filed, "inasmuch as this precise question has not previously
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been presented, we do not find the appeal to have been frivolous." (R. 667) The
Court denied Sonnenreich's request for attorney fees. (R. 667)
The District Court8 heard oral argument on Sonnenreich's motion for
attorney fees on October 16, 2001, and subsequently entered a Memorandum
Decision granting the motion for fees pursuant to the bad faith filing statute and
asking Sonnenreich's counsel to submit an affidavit "of appropriate fees." (R.
905; 669-675) The Memorandum Decision summarized the parties' positions,
and reviewed the elements for awarding attorney's fees.

(R. 669-675)

The

substance of the court's decision is set forth verbatim:
Applying the aforementioned [elements] to the facts of this
case, it appears Judge Stirba in her ruling found the Crandall and
Schwenke cases to be applicable in this matter, thus resulting in a
finding that the action was found to be clearly meritless.
As to the issue of whether the Complaint was brought in bad
faith, "In order to find that a party acted in bad faith, the trial court
must determine that at least one of the following factors existed: (i)
The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in
question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage
of others; or ( i i i ) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge
that the activities in question would hinder, delay or defraud others."
See Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). Obviously
an accusation that a party has brought a complaint in bad faith is a
serious matter. However, in the present case, given the lack of
foundation for the action,* combined with the total lack of a factual
basis on the issue of notice, the Court finds this matter could not
have been brought with an honest belief in its propriety.
(R. 673-674) This passage included a footnote, the placement of which is shown
by an asterisk, that stated, "Particularly true in light of the existing case law." (R.

Sonnenreich submitted a proposed Final Judgment (Attorney Fees) along
with an Attorneys' Fees Affidavit with attached timesheets. (R. 769-781) The
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Initial Affidavit requested attorney fees in the amount of $26,418.25 and costs in
the amount of $690.76. (R. 769-781) The OPC objected to the proposed Final
Judgment, and to the Initial Affidavit. (R. 707-731) It also requested a hearing.
(R. 707)

After the OPC objected to particular aspects of the attorneys' fee

award, Sonnenreich's counsel submitted another affidavit ("Second Affidavit").
(R. 749-753)

In it, Sonnenreich's counsel recounted three experiences in the

1970s representing clients in admission cases, and "supervision of the defense
of certain bar charges which have been brought against attorneys at Jones
Waldo during the past twenty years." (R. 749-753)

He also summarized his

experience in administrative law and litigation, and added charges totaling
$3,673 for "preparing the reply to the OPC's response to our attorneys' fees
claim." (R. 749-753) Additionally, Sonnenreich objected to the OPC's request
for a hearing. (R. 746-748)
The District Court denied the OPC's request for a hearing, and awarded
Sonnenreich attorney's fees in the amount of $27,213.25. (R. 800-802; 803-805)
It entered the judgment on January 11, 2002, and one week later Sonnenreich
filed an Application for Writ of Garnishment. (R. 804; 806-807)
Sonnenreich subsequently filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief of Clerical
Error asking the District Court to revise the Final Judgment to an amount totaling
$30,886.25. (R. 821-823; 808-820)

The District Court entered a revised

judgment as requested. (R. 891-892; 893-894) The Revised Final Judgment
raised no additional issues; it merely added several thousand dollars to the

By this time, Judge Burton had been assigned to the case.
11

amount of the judgment. The OPC will address particular details of the attorneys'
fee award below.
The Case on Appeal
The OPC filed a Notice of Appeal in the District Court on January 29, 2002
("second appeal"), followed by a Docketing Statement in this Court. (R. 838-839;
Docketing Statement, February 19, 2002) Sonnenreich filed a motion requesting
that the Court summarily affirm the District Court. (Rule 10 Motion for Summary
Affirmance, March 8, 2002) The Court deferred ruling on this motion "until further
consideration," and directed the parties to "proceed to the next stage in the
appellate process." (Order, April 8, 2002) Accordingly, the OPC proceeded with
briefing its appeal; the brief was due June 5, 2002.
Just one week before the OPC's brief was due, Sonnenreich moved to
dismiss the OPC's second appeal.

She contended that the OPC's notice of

appeal was not filed in a timely fashion. (Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, May 29, 2002)

Essentially, Sonnenreich argued that the

OPC was required to file another Notice of Appeal after the District Court revised
the amount of the final judgment. This Court denied the motion. (Order, August
12, 2002) Accordingly, the OPC resumed work on its brief. The matter is now
before the Court on its merits.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Bar may administratively suspend attorneys who fail to pay their
annual licensing fee. If the attorney continues to practice law during the period of
administrative suspension, the OPC may prosecute the attorney for violating the
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Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. The
District Court erred in concluding otherwise in connection with the OPC's
prosecution of a disciplinary action against Sonnenreich predicted upon her
alleged UPL while she was administratively suspended. Additionally the District
Court erred in concluding that the OPC's Complaint failed to satisfy applicable
rules: the Complaint was sufficiently specific in identifying the OPC's allegations
against Sonnenreich. The court also erred in finding that Sonnenreich did not
receive notice of her administrative suspension; whether Sonnenreich received
actual notice is a matter in dispute, but the OPC contends that the notice the Bar
gives is sufficient. Finally, the District Court erred in awarding attorneys fees to
Sonnenreich pursuant to the bad faith filing statute, and in awarding fees in an
amount that was not reasonable. A Screening Panel directed the OPC to file the
action, the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee reviewed and signed it,
and the OPC drafted and filed it in the honest belief in its propriety. Accordingly,
the OPC asks the Court to reverse the District Court's award of attorneys' fees,
and to remand the case for further proceedings in District Court.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The Rules Authorize the Utah State Bar to Administratively Suspend
the Licenses of Attorneys Who Fail to Pay Their Licensing Fees
A.

The Source of the Bar's Authority to Administratively Suspend
the Licenses of Attorneys Who Do Not Pay the License Fee

Lawyers are required to pay an annual license fee to the Utah State Bar;
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") provide that "[ejvery
lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall pay to the Bar on or before July 1 of
each year an annual license fee for each fiscal year.. . . u Rule 8, RLDD.
13

The RLDD further provide that:
[a]ny attorney who shall practice law while suspended for nonpayment of the license fee violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct and may be disciplined for practicing while suspended for
non-payment of dues. The Executive Director of the Bar shall give
notice of such removal from the rolls to such non-complying
member at the address on record at the Bar, to the Utah Supreme
Court and to the judges of the district courts. The non-complying
member may apply in writing for re-enrollment upon tendering the
license fees and an additional $100 delinquent fee. Upon receiving
the same, the Board of Commissioners shall accept it and order reenrollment. Re-enrollment based on suspension for non-payment
does not negate any orders of discipline.
Rule 8(b), RLDD.9 In short, the RLDD authorize the Bar, through its Executive
Director, to suspend the licenses of attorneys who do not pay their annual license
fee. Because such a suspension is not a disciplinary sanction, this Brief refers to
it as an "administrative" suspension.10
B.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Formal
Complaints for Practicing While Administratively Suspended
Must Be Instituted By the Bar Commission

The District Court appears to have concluded that the Bar has no authority
to administratively suspend an attorney.

(R. 282-289)

The basis of this

contention is the court's rejection of the Bar's claimed authority to impose
administrative suspensions. (R. 286-287)
Turning to OPC's claimed sources of authority to 'administratively
suspend/ the first, 'board-approved licensing policies and
procedures' are dated January, 2000, and have no bearing on the
suspension in September, 1999. Indeed, according to the Clerk of
the Utah Supreme Court, such have not been presented, let alone
9

This portion of the rule was added on April 19, 1999—several months before
Sonnenreich was administratively suspended for non-payment of her dues. See
Amendment Notes, Rule 8, RLDD.
10
Administrative suspensions also include suspensions for failure to comply with
mandatory continuing legal education requirements. These are premised on
other rules, however, and are not addressed in this Brief.
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approved, by the Utah Supreme Court. Finally, with respect to the
second source, the Utah Supreme Court's 1993 Integration Order,
the Utah Supreme Court held in 1997 that:
The change in the initial formal adjudication of Bar
complaints did not alter the unique constitutional role that
this Court has in attorney discipline cases. Article VIII,
section 4 of the Utah Constitution states, The Supreme
Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of
persons admitted to practice law.' [citation omitted]
In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997). Furthermore,
pursuant to the statute and rule in effect at the time of this
suspension and now, district court actions for practicing while
suspended must be instituted by the Bar Commission.
(R. 286-287)
When Sonnenreich filed a Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, and a
memorandum in support thereof, contending among other things that the Bar
lacks the power to suspend attorneys, and that a District Court action can only be
instituted by the Board of Bar Commissioners, the OPC responded with a
memorandum that attached as an exhibit the Rules for Integration and
Management of the Utah State Bar ("Rules for Integration and Management").
(R. 191-207) Regrettably, the version of the rules used for the exhibit was a
version amended in May 2000—after the period relevant to this matter. This was
an inadvertent oversight, and Sonnenreich attached the appropriate version to
one of her own memoranda. (R. 242-255)
The differences between the two versions of the rules are insubstantial
with respect to the OPC's argument, however. Briefly summarized, the argument
is that the Rules for Integration and Management implicitly provide for the Bar's
administrative suspension of attorneys for failure to pay their annual licensing
fees. The OPC's authority to prosecute attorneys who practice law while they
15

are under an administrative suspension resides in Rule 8 of the RLDD. This is
the OPC's position under either generation of the Rules for Integration and
Management. By administratively suspending Sonnenreich, the Bar did not
impermissibly encroach upon the Court's territory.

Likewise, by prosecuting

attorneys who continue to practice law while their licenses to practice have been
suspended, the OPC did not impermissibly encroach upon the territory of the Bar
Commission. In both instances, the Bar and the OPC merely undertook their
respective assigned roles.
II.

The OPC Can Premise a UPL Complaint Upon an Attorney's
Administrative Suspension
A.

The OPC's Authority to Bring a Disciplinary Complaint Based
on an Attorney's Continued Practice of Law While on an
Administrative Suspension Resides in the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability

The District Court appears to have concluded that the OPC has no
authority to bring a District Court action against a respondent for practicing while
administratively suspended.
Furthermore, pursuant to the statute and rule in effect at the time of
this suspension and now, district court actions for practicing while
suspended must be instituted by the Bar Commission.
(R. 287 (emphasis added)) This was error.
The RLDD provide: "In the event the screening panel finds probable cause
to believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint
is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district court a formal
complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts upon which the
charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable provisions of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 11(a), RLDD. The RLDD extend no similar
authority to the Bar Commission, let alone an exclusive authority of the sort
suggested by the District Court.
Pursuant to its authority under Rule 10(b)(5)(E) of the RLDD, a Screening
Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee directed "[t]hat a formal complaint
be filed against the respondent." (R. 155) That is what the OPC did.
B.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That the Crandall
Decision Precludes the OPC from Bringing a District Court
Action Upon a Respondent's UPL While on an Administrative
Suspension

The District Court erroneously concluded that the Crandall case prohibited
the OPC from proceeding as it did in prosecuting Sonnenreich for UPL allegedly
committed while she was on an administrative suspension. The portion of the
court's Memorandum Decision addressing this point is as follows:
As an initial matter, it is important to note that both the Bar and
Sonnenreich agree her suspension was 'administrative.1 This is
critical because in the case of In Re Crandall, wherein Crandall was
suspended and ultimately disbarred for failure to timely pay his
fees, the Utah Supreme Court held 'there is no logical connection
between an attorney's failure to pay his or her licensing fee and
claimed unfitness to practice law.' Id. at 1196. The Court
instructed the Bar that it could not punish an attorney for alleged
ethics violations 'either caused or aggravated by the suspension.'
id. at 1197. The Court expressly forbad the Bar from using the
administrative suspension procedure as an 'end-run approach'
around other procedures for disciplining attorneys. ]d. at 1196.
Finally, the Court noted that by premising discipline on its own
administrative suspension, the Bar had evaded the requirement
that it bear the burden of presenting evidence of the attorney's lack
of fitness to practice and establishing harm to the public, \d.
By premising Sonnenreich's violation of Rule 5.5, which forbids
practicing while suspended, on an administrative suspension, the
Bar is doing exactly what the Court forbade in Crandall. Indeed,
Sonnenreich's violation of Rule 5.5 was caused by the
administrative suspension and was not premised on the OPC
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demonstrating Sonnenreich had Irreparably' damaged the public
and committed a violation of the code of professional conduct or
was suffering from a disability as required by Rule 18 of the Rules
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
Additionally, the Court in Crandall made clear the necessity for
actual notice. In this case, it is undisputed no actual notice of the
alleged suspension was received by Sonnenreich.
(R. 285-286)
This was error. Crandall does not forbid the OPC from taking the course
of action it took in this case. See In re Crandall 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989).
The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, which were the rules
effective at the time Crandall was prosecuted, included a rule permitting the Bar
to suspend attorneys for failure to pay license fees and then to continue the
suspension for unrelated reasons, "giving the Bar a summary method of handling
disciplinary problems." See Crandall, 784 P.2d at 1194. Crandall received a
letter from the Bar notifying him of his removal from the roll of attorneys because
he failed to pay his annual license fee. See id. at 1195. After receiving the letter,
Crandall contacted the Bar, offering to immediately submit his delinquent fee, but
the Bar deferred action on his request for reinstatement for a couple of months.
See id. In the meantime, Crandall appeared for a hearing on a complaint that
predated the administrative suspension for failure to pay his dues, and the
hearing panel recommended a suspension. See id. Subsequent hearings were
conducted while Crandall continued under the administrative suspension, as well
as the disciplinary suspension.

See id.

In other words, there was nothing

Crandall could do to secure his reinstatement while the disciplinary matter was
pending.
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This Court struck the language of the rule permitting a suspension for
failure to pay dues to continue beyond the time when the attorney paid the
delinquent fee. See id. at 1196. The rules effective at the time included an
interim suspension procedure that could be employed while a disciplinary
proceeding is pending.

See id.

The Court noted that "The suspension of

attorneys for failure to pay the license fee is necessary and appropriate.
However, it is inappropriate that the Bar should be able to refuse reinstatement
after the delinquent fee is paid for a reason unrelated to the initial suspension.
The other procedures for disciplining attorneys under the Procedures of
Discipline preclude any need for this 'end-run' approach." ]d.
Rule 8 of the RLDD, the rule applicable to this case, is consistent with the
language adopted by the Court in Crandall.

As previously noted, the rule

requires the Board of Commissioners to accept the application and payment of
the delinquent fee, and order re-enrollment. See Rule 8(b), RLDD. That is what
happened with Sonnenreich: she paid her licensing fee and a delinquent fee and
was immediately reinstated from her administrative suspension. The Crandall
situation never even arose because, in contrast to the Bar's refusal to reinstate
Crandall when he petitioned for reinstatement and paid the fees, Sonnenreich
was reinstated. The matter of Sonnenreich's alleged UPL while she was on an
administrative suspension was not adjudicated, and Sonnenreich was free to
practice as soon as she paid the fee. Moreover, the OPC's attempt to prosecute
the UPL allegations against Sonnenreich was not an "end-run" in the sense
discussed in Crandall because the allegations the OPC raised are directly related
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to the administrative suspension—in Crandall, many of the additional complaints
derived from wholly unrelated conduct, some of it even preceding Crandall's
administrative suspension.
Rule 8 also explicitly provides that "[a]ny attorney who shall practice law
while suspended for non-payment of the license fee violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct and may be disciplined for practicing while suspended for
non-payment of dues." Rule 8(b), RLDD. The action against Sonnenreich was
consistent with what this rule permits, and the OPC approached it in the manner
specified by the rules.

Meanwhile Sonnenreich's ability to practice law was

unimpaired, inasmuch as she was reinstated upon the payment of her fees.
The District Court also stated that "the Court in Crandall made clear the
necessity for actual notice." (R. 286) This Court did not, however, address in
Crandall whether actual notice of the administrative suspension is required;
Crandall did in fact receive the notice, and it therefore was not an issue in his
case. See Crandall, 784 P.2d at 1195. Crandall raised notice arguments as to
some of the subsequent disciplinary charges, but those were not specially
addressed by the Court.
With respect to the District Court's comments concerning Rule 18, RLDD,
the OPC observes that the RLDD provide two mechanisms by which the OPC
may seek in the District Court a respondent's interim suspension for serious
types of misconduct

See Rule 18, RLDD; Rule 19, RLDD.11

These differ

dramatically from administrative suspensions imposed by the Bar for failure to
11

It is the District Court, not the Bar or the OPC, that imposes interim
suspension.
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pay dues, and are employed to prevent an attorney from continuing to practice
law pending the resolution of the underlying disciplinary matter. Neither of these
mechanisms would have been appropriate to this case, given that Sonnenreich's
alleged misconduct involved neither a criminal conviction within the meaning of
Rule 19, nor conduct that "poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the
public" within the meaning of Rule 18.

The District Court's Memorandum

Decision appears to be predicated in part upon an erroneous conflation of the
interim suspension rules.
III.

The OPC's Complaint Satisfied the Requirements of the Applicable
Rules
The District Court erred in concluding that the OPC's Complaint failed to

satisfy the requirements of Rule 11 of the RLDD and Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It stated,
[l]n the Complaint it is alleged, 'Respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law when she practiced and held herself
out as an attorney during the period of her suspension prior to her
reinstatement, thus violating Rules 5.5 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.' Besides the fact that the screening panel
found no violation of Rule 8.4, the Complaint fails to provide
sufficient facts to satisfy either Rule 11 of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability or Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Indeed, although it can be assumed from the
memorandum in opposition that it was Sonnenreich's statement to
Mr. Birrel [sic] that constituted unauthorized practice, there is no
indication in the Complaint as to what specific actions were taken
by Sonnenreich.
(R. 287-288) The court's conclusions are erroneous in two respects.
First, contrary to what the District Court stated, the Screening Panel
found a violation of Rule 8.4. The Screening Panel Information Sheet, which is
signed by the Panel chair, includes the following paragraph:
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Based upon any finding(s) that the Respondent violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the Panel finds that the Respondent also
violated Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules, which provides, "It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." This rule is
known as the 'bread and butter1 charge in professional misconduct
cases because it accompanies other charges in Bar disciplinary
actions. See e.g. Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 662 So.2d 586 (Miss.
1995).
(R. 153) This was before the court as part of the OPC's memorandum opposing
Sonnenreich's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 88-207) The District
Court's finding is obviously erroneous.
Second, the Complaint is sufficient to satisfy the applicable rules. The
RLDD provide that:
OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district court a formal
complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts upon
which the charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 11(a), RLDD.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have a similar

requirement: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
Rule 8(a), Utah R. Civ. Pro.
The rules do not require more than notice of what is being pled. As this
Court has indicated, "a pleader is required only to make a short and plain
statement of his claim, . . . and the requirement of technical exactness is
excluded.

Fine detail is not required. . . .

The new rules, . . . restrict the

pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery
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process with a vital role in the preparation for trial." Blackham v. A.M. Snelqrove,
280 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1955) (citations omitted; quoting Burr v. Childs, 265
P.2d 383 (Utah 1953)). Indeed, "a complaint is required only to '*** give the
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved.' It may also frequently be
found stated in these cases that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless '
*** it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.'" Id. at 455
(footnotes omitted); see also Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986)
(Rule 8(a) to be liberally construed when determining sufficiency of complaint).
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 11 of the RLDD, the OPC's
Complaint identified the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct allegedly
violated—Rules 5.5 and 8.4(a). (R. 3) As to the facts upon which the alleged
rule violations were predicated, the Complaint stated that "During the period of
her suspension, although she was removed from the rol[l]s of active attorneys in
the State of Utah and was not, therefore, authorized to practice law in the State
of Utah, Respondent continued to hold herself out as an attorney and practiced
law." (R. 3) Sonnenreich thus had fair notice of the nature and basis of the
claims, including the allegation that she continued to hold herself out as an
attorney, and the allegation that she continued to practice law, despite having
been placed on an administrative suspension. Further details were not required.
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IV.

The District Court Erred In Finding That Sonnenreich Received No
Notice of Her Administrative Suspension
The District Court stated, "the Court in Crandall made clear the necessity

for actual notice. In this case, it is undisputed no actual notice of the alleged
suspension was received by Sonnenreich." (R. 286) It was error for the court to
make such a finding in the context of entering summary judgment.
The OPC's position is that Sonnenreich had notice when the letter
informing her of the administrative suspension was sent by certified mail to the
address she furnished to the Bar. The OPC believes this is sufficient because
the RLDD require only that "[t]he Executive Director of the Bar shall give notice of
such removal from the rolls to such non-complying member at the address on
record at the Bar. . .." Rule 8(b), RLDD. The RLDD do not require actual notice
or personal service.

Indeed, requiring actual notice would be an expensive

process and unfairly reward those who do not pay their license fee and do not
take steps to inform the Bar of their whereabouts. The Bar and the OPC believe
this issue is a matter of first impression for the Court, and accordingly ask its
guidance so that procedures may be amended if the Court deems necessary.
Further, the District Court erred in making findings of fact in the context of
rendering a summary judgment. The finding that Sonnenreich received no actual
notice is an instance of this. It is error because summary judgment may be
rendered only when there is no issue as to any material fact

See Rule 56(c),

Utah R. Civ. Pro.; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (grant of summary judgment precluded where trial
judge made and entered findings and conclusions, the content of which evidence
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material issues of fact). Further, the OPC is not required to proffer affidavits to
avoid summary judgment against it. See Mountain States Telephone, 681 P.2d
at 1261 ("Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.").
That the OPC considered Sonnenreich "on notice" concerning her administrative
suspension is demonstrated by the contentions it made, which were supported
by the Birrell Affidavit, concerning her tardiness in paying her annual license fee
five other times since 1993, in one instance resulting in an administrative
suspension, and the fact that she never received confirmation in the form of the
annual licensing sticker issued by the Bar. That Sonnenreich may have had
actual notice may be inferred from the Birrell Affidavit and from the OPC's
arguments throughout these proceedings. It did not, however, seek the District
Court's permission to make discovery, as Sonnenreich suggests it could have
done, because it considered the point a peripheral one, inasmuch as
Sonnenreich was on notice, and this is all the rule requires.
V.

The OPC Filed Its Complaint In Good Faith, and the District Court
Erred in Awarding Sonnenreich Attorneys5 Fees Under the Bad Faith
Filing Statute
The District Court's Memorandum Decision concerning the award of

attorneys' fees stated that "given the lack of foundation for the action, combined
with the total lack of a factual basis on the issue of notice, the Court finds this
matter could not have been brought with an honest belief in its propriety." (R.
673-674)

The District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Sonnenreich

based upon its determination that the OPC's action against her was without merit
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and not brought or asserted in good faith within the meaning of Utah Code
section 78-27-56. The OPC assumes that if the Court determines that the OPC's
Complaint against Sonnenreich had legal merit, at least as to its premises, then
the award of attorneys' fees would be set aside. This would of course dispose of
the necessity of the Court's further addressing the attorneys' fees issues. But
even if the Court determines that the OPC, the Screening Panel, and the Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee were mistaken in their interpretations of the
rules and the case law elucidating those rules, the OPC appeals the award of
attorneys' fees because it had an honest belief in the propriety of its actions,
thereby making the award inappropriate.
The OPC will not review the merits of its Complaint and the underlying
authority therefor because these have been addressed above.

Instead, this

portion of its Brief will address whether the District Court erred in awarding
attorney fees to Sonnenreich based on its determination that the OPC's action
against her was not brought or asserted in good faith within the meaning of the
bad faith filing statute. This issue is a mixed question of law and fact, and the
applicable standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard.

See

Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998).
If the Screening Panel directs the OPC to file a District Court action
against a respondent, the OPC has no discretion to do otherwise.12 The RLDD
12

The exception would be if the Screening Panel directed the OPC to file a
Complaint in District Court that the individual attorney could not file consistent
with the attorneys' obligations under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Such a case has not yet arisen, but the OPC assures the Court that
it would not blindly follow the Screening Panel's directive if it conflicted with the
OPC attorneys' Rule 11 responsibilities. Although the RLDD do not address
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provide no leeway or discretion on this: "In the event the screening panel finds
probable cause to believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a
formal complaint is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district
court a formal complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts
upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 11(a), RLDD (emphasis
added). The Screening Panel found probable cause in Sonnenreich's case, and
the OPC drafted the Complaint pursuant to the Panel's directive. Additionally,
the District Court Complaint must be signed by the Chair of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee, or by another Committee member in the chair's absence.
See Rule 11(a), RLDD. Accordingly, although an OPC attorney drafted and
signed the Complaint, the person who was the Chair at the time the action was
filed against Sonnenreich also signed it. The probable cause hearing before the
Screening Panel, coupled with the Chair's review of Complaints before they are
filed, safeguard the disciplinary process from any possible maverick action by the
OPC. Given that these procedures were followed, the OPC could not have acted
in bad faith.
Sonnenreich has argued that the OPC's alleged bad faith is evidenced by
the fact that it "entirely failed to raise any tenable legal argument on the key issue
in this case." Memorandum in Support of Rule 10 Motion, at 10. In support, she
contends that she cited extensive case law supporting the right to "notice and an
opportunity to defend before their licenses may be taken from them," but the
such a situation, it is possible that this Court could appoint Special Counsel
under the direction of the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee to file the
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OPC "blew by the issue" with its response that "the cited case law pertains only
to suspension for attorney misconduct rather than suspension for nonpayment."
Id. at 10-11.
The OPC did not address at further length the cases Sonnenreich cited
because they are readily distinguished from the facts in Sonnenreich's case.
Each of the cases

she cited

concerned

disciplinary

suspensions, not

administrative suspensions for failure to pay annual licensing fees. There are
fundamental differences between the two types of suspension, and because of
these differences, the cases are not controlling. This is not to deny that the Court
may at some point in the future determine that some of the same safeguards that
apply to disciplinary suspensions, including interim suspensions, also apply in the
administrative suspension context; it is merely to say that the Court has not yet
made this determination or given this directive.
Sonnenreich has also cited a decision from the Supreme Court of
Washington.

See Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 493 P.2d 1237

(Wash. 1972); Memorandum in Support of Rule 10 Motion, at 11-13.

Citing

Schwab, Sonnenreich contends that administrative suspension cannot be the
basis of a disciplinary proceeding. The differences between the licensing and
discipline systems in Washington at the time Schwab was issued (the case is
thirty years old) and Utah at the time of Sonnenreich's alleged misconduct are
substantial and render Schwab inapposite to this case. The licensing renewal
process in Washington was set by statute, not by court rule. See Schwab, 493
P.2d 1237 (citations throughout the decision refer to the Revised Code of
Complaint.
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Washington). Schwab was suspended for nonpayment of his dues pursuant to a
statute.

See id. at 1238.

Another statute provided that the bar's board of

governors hears all cases involving discipline and makes recommendations to
the Supreme Court of Washington subject to the Court's approval. See id. at
1239. The court continued, stating that "[t]he ultimate constitutional power clearly
lies within the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." Id. It concluded, "In the
instant case, although the board of bar governors routinely proceeded with the
suspension procedure, we did not exercise our exclusive power to issue an order
of suspension. Until so ordered by the Supreme Court, petitioner's authority to
practice law and his membership in the Washington State Bar Association were
not suspended," id.
In Utah, the RLDD and the Rules for Integration and Management of the
Utah State Bar provide no mechanism by which this Court directly orders
administrative suspensions for attorneys who fail to pay annual licensing fees.13
By rule, the Bar does this. To be sure, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the regulation of the practice of law, but the Bar and the District Courts act as its
agent in carrying out some of these functions.
Sonnenreich has contended that the record establishes that the OPC
through one of its attorneys "selected her for prosecution" as retaliation for
Sonnenreich's complaint against the attorney. See Memorandum in Support of
13

Sonnenreich notes that "[t]his court has favorably cited Schwab," and cites
the Court's decision in In re Hansen. Memorandum in Support of Rule 10
Motion, at 12. This is correct, insofar as it goes, but it is not helpful to resolving
this case. See In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, n.4 (Utah 1978). Hansen was
decided long before the new procedural rules were implemented, at a time when

Rule 10 Motion, at 13-14. Sonnenreich contends that "the obvious conclusion" to
draw from the fact that she complained about OPC attorney Carol Stewart to
Executive Director John Baldwin is that "OPC counsel selected Sonnenreich with
no evidence that she had received notice and no legal basis for so doing," as
"retaliation against her for her complaint against Stewart."

Sonnenreich's

conclusions are mistaken, however.
Carol Stewart, who was then the OPC's Deputy Counsel, did not "select"
Sonnenreich for prosecution. Every year, the Bar provides the courts and the
OPC a list of attorneys who have been administratively suspended for failing to
pay their annual licensing fees on time. The OPC does not initiate any type of
investigation based on its receipt of the list: there are no implications for
professional discipline arising solely from an attorney's failure to pay dues.
The OPC does, however, initiate investigations upon its receipt of
information suggesting that an attorney is practicing law while on administrative
suspension. That is what it did in Sonnenreich's case, as well as all similar
cases. Ironically, to do otherwise with respect to Sonnenreich's case would have
been to single her out—the very result she contends has victimized her
Sonnenreich has stated that the OPC "larded its Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Attorneys fees with repetitive assertions as to its own
good faith, but it failed to submit even a self-serving affidavit from Ms. Stewart
explaining that she was not influenced by the fact that Sonnenreich had reported
her."

Memorandum in Support of Rule 10 Motion, at 14. This illustrates the

disciplinary recommendations were made by the Bar, and only imposed by order
of this Court.
30

OPC's dilemma: it could have submitted a "self-serving affidavit," but this would
hardly end the matter.

Instead, the OPC chose to assert its good faith with

explanations concerning the manner in which it investigates and prosecutes
similar complaints pursuant to the RLDD, and pointing out the disciplinary
system's many safeguards for preventing retaliation of the type Sonnenreich
alleges. (R. 491-538)

This seemed preferable to submitting an affidavit that

would have been unlikely to reassure Sonnenreich.
More specifically, the OPC explained to the District Court that it files
actions pursuant to the directive of the Screening Panel and consistent with the
RLDD. (R. 491-538) In other words, as the OPC noted above, whether to initiate
the suit is not a decision made by the OPC, it is the decision of a quorum of four
members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee appointed by this Court (not the
Utah State Bar) who review the evidence and the law and, where warranted by
probable cause, instruct the OPC to file the action. See Rules 10, 11, RLDD.
Further, the Complaint is reviewed and signed by the Chair of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee, who by doing so undertakes the certifications of good faith
set forth in Rule 11 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sonnenreich has contended that the record "contains overwhelming and
undisputed support for the district court's determination that OPC lacked a goodfaith belief in the propriety of its position on the actual notice issue."
Memorandum in Support of Rule 10 Motion, at 15. Again the OPC is constrained
to observe that these "facts" were not the basis stated for the District Court's
award of attorneys' fees, nor have they been adjudicated.

Sonnenreich has contended that the OPC exceeded the finding of the
Screening Panel, and this evidences its bad faith. See Memorandum in Support
of Rule 10 Motion, at 16. She added, "The record indicates that OPC made a
parking ticket (and a dubious one at that) into a death penalty case." Id.
The Screening Panel Informal Decision Sheet recommended that the OPC
file a formal complaint against Sonnenreich in District Court for violations of
Rules 5.5 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the OPC has
explained elsewhere, this is a directive it must obey. The Screening Panel's
handwritten notation to the effect that the violations were negligent and there was
no finding of harm did not, in the estimation of the OPC, negate the Panel's clear
instruction to file the Complaint in District Court.
Sonnenreich has also contended that "[t]he record also raises serious
issues of selective prosecution." Memorandum in Support of Rule 10 Motion, at
16. Sonnenreich is mistaken. The OPC prosecuted all similar cases that year,
and did not "ignoreQ attorneys who were 'caught' when they tried to file Third
District Pleadings."

Id.

The Screening Panel conducts what amounts to a

probable cause hearing, and it alone decides which cases proceed to District
Court through filing a formal Complaint.

Of the other informal complaints

presented to the Screening Panel on the date Sonnenreich's case was
presented, the OPC has filed Complaints in District Court in each case in which it
was directed to do so, and secured an admonition in the case in which an
admonition was recommended. The Screening Panel directed the dismissal of
the rest of the cases.
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Finally, the OPC observes that it has prosecuted other similar complaints
against respondent attorneys through the years.

The Bar's authority to

administratively suspend, and the OPC's authority to prosecute resides in the
rules, but is also a matter of common sense: if there can be no administrative
suspension and no disciplinary consequences arising from an attorney's practice
of law while on an administrative suspension, there are few compelling reasons
to pay the annual licensing fee.
VI.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding AH of the
Attorneys1 Fees Claimed
The District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees in the

amount claimed in the two affidavits submitted by Sonnenreich's counsel. (R.
769-781; 749-753) The applicable standard of review is an abuse of discretion
standard. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996).
The Initial Affidavit provided no evidence, and the Second Affidavit
provided only scant evidence, that the hourly rates charged are consistent with
the rates customarily charged to defend attorney discipline cases in this
community, and a significant number of the charges were unrelated to the District
Court's ruling on the allowance of attorney fees.

(R. 769-781; 749-753)

Additionally, some of the charges set forth in the Initial Affidavit and awarded by
the District Court are not legally proper. (R. 769-781) Moreover, the attorneys'
fees set forth in the Initial Affidavit are excessive because the case terminated at
an early stage by summary judgment. (R. 769-781) Finally, the District Court
awarded costs in direct contravention of Rule 30, RLDD. (R. 769-781; 803-805)
The OPC will address each of these in turn, but a preliminary review of the

history of the case is essential background for evaluating the award,
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Permitting an
Excessive Hourly Rate

In determining a reasonable fee, a trial court should answer four
questions: What legal work was actually performed? How much of the work was
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?

Is the attorney's

billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services?

Are there circumstances that require consideration of additional

factors including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?14 See
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); see also
Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86 (Court reviewed reasonableness of
$22,000 of costs and fees generated in obtaining discovery order; concurring
opinion exhorted trial judges to "closely scrutinize requests for attorney fees to
determine that not only the hourly rate is reasonable, but the attorney's time
spent has been used economically on the task. It is not enough that the number
of hours claiming to have been spent was actually spent.").
The Initial Affidavit provides no evidence that the billing rate is consistent
with the rates customarily charged in this locality for similar services. (R. 770771)

The Second Affidavit identified three experiences counsel had in the

1970s representing clients in admissions cases, and "supervision of the defense
of certain bar charges which have been brought against attorneys at Jones
Waldo during the past twenty years." (R. 749-753) Counsel also summarized
his administrative law and litigation experiences, and added charges for
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"preparing the reply to the OPC's response to attorneys' fees claim." (R. 749753)
The Sonnenreich matter is an attorney discipline case.

Her counsel's

twenty-nine years of experience, his knowledge of the hourly rates customarily
charged by attorneys of like experience, and the amount of time customarily
required to perform the activities involved in this engagement, are only pertinent
to the hourly rate claimed and time charged in this case if his experience
included representing respondents in attorney discipline cases similar to that of
attorneys with experience in defending discipline actions. No such certificate is
made in either the Initial Affidavit or the Second Affidavit, which merely identifies
the experience counsel gained in three admissions cases more than twenty-five
years ago and vaguely alludes to supervising the defense of firm attorneys in
disciplinary matters. See Kerr v. Kerr 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-1385 (Utah 1980)
(Supreme Court remanded divorce case on reasonableness of attorney fees
issue where evidence was absent on rates commonly charged in community for
divorce actions).
Almost all of the charges on the time sheet attached to the Initial Affidavit
are attributed to the attorney who signed the affidavit. (R. 774-781) Counsel did
not certify that he has had attorney discipline case defense work experience that
would justify the hourly rate of $230 or $250,15 or that his hourly rate is

The Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the Code of Professional
Responsibility. See Compiler's Notes, Rules of Professional Conduct.
15
For most items, counsel claims the hourly rate of $230, but several are
charged at an hourly rate of $250.
1R

comparable to that of other attorneys in this locality who have had the same
amount of attorney discipline case experience. (R. 771-773)
Indeed, the time sheet entries suggest counsel's lack of experience in the
area of defending attorney discipline cases. One example of this is the 2.75
hours counsel charged on May 22, 2000 to confer with his client regarding a
possible demand for a jury trial.

(R. 774-781) A glance at the RLDD reveals

that attorney discipline cases are tried before the bench, not a jury. Part of three
hours of a paralegal's time at $70 an hour was also used to research the jury trial
issue on the same date. (R. 774-781) Bench trials are a fundamental aspect of
attorney discipline cases in Utah, and the time counsel and his paralegal devoted
to researching and discussing this particular question reflects his inexperience
with attorney discipline cases.16 The District Court abused its discretion when it
failed to lower counsel's excessive hourly rates to the same hourly rates charged
by attorneys in the community who have experience in attorney discipline cases.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Charges
for Work Not Reasonably Necessary, Including Charges for
Work Unrelated to Matters Encompassed By the Award of
Attorneys' Fees and By Allowing Charges Not Permitted By
Law

Sonnenreich can only claim attorney fees for work related to the main
cause of action. See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n. 657 P.2d
1279, 1288 (Utah 1982); see also Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d
16

Contrary to counsel's assertion in the Second Affidavit, the OPC is not
suggesting that lawyers shouldn't review the law and the applicable procedural
rules. (R. 751) Instead, what it is suggesting is that anyone familiar with basic
procedural rules in attorney discipline cases would not require nearly three hours
of attorney time and a comparable amount of paralegal time to answer such a
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62, 66 (Utah 1981) ("A party is therefore entitled only to those fees resulting from
its principal cause of action for which there is a contractual (or statutory)
obligation for attorney's fees."). Counsel itemized a number of charges for work
unrelated to work that was the basis for the award of attorney fees pursuant to
the bad faith filing statute.

Examples of this include the charges related to

responding to the OPC's objection to the proposed Judgment, the OPC's first
appeal to this Court, and a Rule 11 Motion that Sonnenreich never filed with the
District Court. (R. 774-781)
The

OPC

objected

to

Sonnenreich's

proposed

Judgment,

and

Sonnenreich filed a response that is not permitted under Rule 4-504 of the Rules
of Judicial Administration. (R. 676-706) Sonnenreich included in her claim for
attorneys' fees charges for preparing this impermissible response. (R. 774-781)
The District Court abused its discretion by allowing charges for this work because
it was unnecessary to the Court's ultimate ruling on the allowance of attorney
fees pursuant to the bad faith filing statute.
The District Court also abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees
for work associated with the OPC's first appeal.

(R. 774-781)

Sonnenreich

moved for summary dismissal of the OPC's first appeal, and asked this Court to
award attorney fees. The Court granted summary dismissal of the first appeal,
albeit on grounds other than those for which Sonnenreich sought the dismissal.
Significantly, "inasmuch as this precise question has not previously been
presented," the Court did not find that the appeal was frivolous and denied
basic question. If such fundamental research is required, the fees should be
adjusted accordingly.
07

Sonnenreich's request for attorney fees. See In re Sonnenreich, Supreme Court
No. 20010459-SC, Order, Sept. 18, 2001. Sonnenreich's claim in the District
Court for attorney's fees for the work her counsel performed in connection with
dismissing the first appeal circumvents this Court's decision denying attorney
fees for the same work.

The District Court abused its discretion by allowing

these charges.
The District Court also abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees
for drafting a Rule 11 Motion. (R. 774-781) Sonnenreich's counsel served the
OPC with a Motion for Rule 11 sanctions in an effort to induce it to withdraw its
first appeal, but no such motion was ever filed, argued, or granted by the District
Court. The District Court's allowance of the charges for preparing the Rule 11
Motion is tantamount to granting the motion, and is an abuse of discretion.
The District Court abused its discretion by permitting attorneys' fees for
work associated with a Supplemental Response sent to the District Court in letter
form by Sonnenreich's counsel after the oral argument on her motion for
attorneys' fees.

(R. 774-781)

The District Court's Memorandum Decision

specifically stated that the decision was made without consideration of the
Supplemental Response, and it therefore is not a legitimate basis for an
attorneys' fee award. (R. 674)
Additionally, there are miscellaneous charges for things that do not appear
to be related to the District Court's ruling on attorney fees.

For example, on

February 1, 2001, there is a charge by JSL for $172.5 (.75 hours) for a
conference call with Sonnenreich regarding procedural and governmental
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immunity issues. (R. 774-781) The OPC has no idea how procedural and
governmental immunity issues relate to the issues of this case. Another example
involves charges attributed to contact with a "DNS" office. (R. 774-781) The
OPC does not know what the "DNS" office is.
The District Court abused its discretion by permitting charges that were
not legally proper.

For example, the Initial Affidavit encompasses charges

attributed to legal work performed by Sonnenreich, although it also asserts that
the fees claimed are conservative because "Sonnenreich, an accomplished
attorney in her own right, rendered valuable cost savings assistance to her case
by doing research, initially drafting pleadings and briefs and legal arguments and
consulting on her defense."

(R. 770)

Attachments to the Initial Affidavit

demonstrate that Sonnenreich was involved through conferences and phone
calls in nearly 50 hours and more than $10,000 of the claimed charges (and this
does not count another 11.90 hours or $2,869.50 of charges the OPC has
addressed as unrelated or unnecessary to the cause of action for attorney fees).
(R. 774-781)
The numerous conferences and phone calls with Sonnenreich do not
appear to be "cost saving assistance;" they appear to be actual legal work
performed by Sonnenreich, who by her counsel's account of it drafted the
pleadings and briefs. It therefore seems likely that the numerous conferences
and phone calls involving Sonnenreich went beyond simply advising her of the
progress of the case. Instead, it appears that Sonnenreich was directing her
counsel on the substantive and procedural editing of these documents, and this
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translates into Sonnenreich actually doing the legal work. Sonnenreich is not
entitled to attorney fees for legal work she performed on her own case. See
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 473-474 (Utah 1992) (pro-se attorney-litigant is
not entitled to recovery of attorney fees for successful litigation).
The District Court abused its discretion by permitting charges attributable
to efforts to obtain competence in attorney discipline matters.

Attorneys are

required to provide competent representation to their clients.

See Rule 1.1,

Rules of Professional

Conduct. Attorney discipline

matters constitute a

specialized area of the law. Competence in this area requires, at minimum, a
working knowledge of the RLDD, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards").

Sonnenreich's

counsel's timesheets demonstrate his lack of a working knowledge of these
rules.17 Moreover, Sonnenreich's claim of charges for 21.55 hours or $4,071.50
to prepare and file an Answer is excessive because it results at least in some
measure from her counsel's need to educate himself concerning attorney
discipline cases.
C.

The Total of the Charges in Light of the Abbreviated Course of
This Case Suggests the District Court Abused Its Discretion

The Initial Affidavit identifies charges of $26,418.25 based on 121.9 hours.
(R. 769-781) The Second Affidavit and Revised Final Judgment merely increase
the amount to $30,886.25.

(R. 749-753)

Neither party conducted discovery;

there was no trial; there have been only a handful of papers associated with the
17

The OPC does not mean to suggest that counsel is generally incompetent, or
to in any way insult him on this point. It is merely suggesting that whereas
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District Court's ruling of November 16, 2001, and just two brief hearings in the
District Court. It is difficult to see how this could generate more than 121 hours
and more than $30,000 in fees.
D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Costs

The District Court abused its discretion in awarding $690.76 in costs
because such an award directly contravenes the express provisions of the
RLDD. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that costs are awarded to the
prevailing party "[ejxcept when express provision is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules." Rule 54(d)(1), Utah R. Civ. Pro. The RLDD provide
that "The respondent shall not be entitled to costs." Rule 30, RLDD. Thus, costs
against the OPC cannot be awarded, and the District Court abused its discretion
by awarding them to Sonnenreich
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in rendering summary judgment against the OPC.
The Utah State Bar has the authority to administratively suspend attorneys who
fail to pay their annual licensing fees, and in turn the OPC has the authority to
predicate a disciplinary complaint for UPL upon an attorney's conduct while on
administrative suspension.

Whether Sonnenreich has violated the Rules of

Professional Conduct by practicing law during the time of her administrative
suspension is a fact that has never been determined because of the District
Court's erroneous conclusion that the Bar and the OPC had exceeded their
respective authorities.

The OPC respectfully asks this Court to provide its

counsel may be a skilled attorney in other settings, he lacks substantial
experience in this area of practice.
A A

guidance concerning the appropriate interpretation of the RLDD, to reverse the
District Court, and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Additionally, the OPC requests that the Court reverse the District Court as
to the award of attorneys' fees under the bad faith filing statute. The OPC filed
its Complaint at the direction of the Screening Panel and only after review and
approval by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. It simply could not
have been taken in bad faith. In the alternative, if the Court permits such an
award, the OPC asks the Court to reduce its amount. Much of what has been
awarded is improper and an abuse of the District Court's discretion.
DATED: September

[ (Q ,2002.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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Deputy Counsel
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